1. The ugar Babies” explains the Haitian immigrants’ labor force in the sugar cane industry. How does the film relate to the reading?2. What is this article about?3. How is the modern process of Haitian migration to the Dominican Republic?4. What economic sectors employ Haitians in the D.R.?5. What are the working conditions of Haitians?6. How does the Dominican state respond to the abuses against Haitians?7. Does the article explain who are the denationalized Haitians?Answer these questions and post your answers in Journal “Haitian Migration.”
1. The ugar Babies” explains the Haitian immigrants’ labor force in the sugar cane industry. How does the film relate to the reading? 2. What is this article about? 3. How is the modern process of H
Capital Changes: Haitian Migrants inContemporary Dominican RepublicKIRAN JAYARAMIntroductionComplexity and diversity stand as one of the hallmarks of the Caribbean(Trouillot 1992), and the island of Hispaniola is certainly no exception to the rule. In this paper, I will show how changes in the Dominican economy along the linesof imperatives of global capitalism transformed the Haitian migration populationin the Dominican Republic, specifically related to labour market insertion. Theshift from sugar production (under state auspices) to tourism along with theconstruction boom (financed by private capital) fostered ruptures andreconfigurations, as seen in new migration patterns, migrants’ connections tocapital flows, changes in anti-Haitian sentiment, and growth of agenciessupporting migrant populations. This article is based upon anthropological research conducted in summer2006 and from October 2007 to December 2009 in Greater Santo Domingo in theDominican Republic. Information about the lower classes came primarily fromHaitians who live and/or work in “Benito”1, secondarily from people at their worksites throughout the Districto Nacional, and tertiarily at people’s homes in theprovince of Santo Domingo. The relationship of the Dominican Republic to insular, regional, andinternational flows of commodities and the specific ways that changes in marketshave impacted the country, requires a brief discussion of capital and capitalism,both in its nature (as it relates to plurality) and its logic (as it relates toneoliberalism and flexibility), as it plays out in the lived experiences of people inthe country. The role of capital cannot be undervalued throughout the course of thiswork. Capital is money involved in a process of commodity exchange that yields a greater amount of value after the exchange than existed before (MàCàM’),where each represents a stage in capital accumulation. A commodity may take theform of a tangible item, like coconuts, chacabanas,2 or currency, but it may alsotake the form of something less than tangible, like labour-power, as inconstruction, or sex work or university studies. Capitalism, therefore, refers to theeconomic system founded upon a never-ending drive to generate profit (andaccumulation of capital) based upon creation and investment of surplus value from 31 commodity exchanges.3 Numerous scholars have dealt with the dynamics ofcapitalism (e.g., Heilbroner, Marx, Polanyi), so I leave extensive discussions ofthe topic aside. In this article, I respond to David Harvey’s challenge to examine“processes of capital accumulation … [and how it] … not only thrives upon butactively produces social difference and heterogeneity” (2001:122). I amparticularly interested in, as he writes, “a more generalized debate about humanpotentialities and the sources of their frustration” (2001:126), and the productionof spaces where novel political and social organizations might emerge. Thesespaces, created by what Ong (2007) calls neoliberalism, understood as thereorganization of the relationship between the state and the market according tothe logic of capitalism, represent opportunities for advocacy on behalf of thosepolitically excluded. Therefore, observing political economic changes over timeshould correspond with analogous changes for migrants in a labour market (whichin this case means Haitian migrants to the Dominican Republic), their reception inthe host country, and advocacy on their behalf. Additionally, examining parts ofcommodity chains in which people participate should disclose connections tocapital flows and political economic structures. Before noting these changes,though, it stands to describe prior meanings of “Haitian” and to depict earlierDominican-Haitian relations. Therefore, I argue that neoliberalism hasrestructured the Dominican political economy, Haitian labour market insertion,and the nature of anti-Haitianism, while creating spaces for advocacy on behalf ofthe new migrants. This fundamentally questions the dominant understanding,which posits that Haitians form a single, homogenous block.Myths of Haitian HomogeneityIt is no surprise that, given the dominance of agricultural production,particularly sugar, in the Dominican Republic for most of its history, and well intothe twentieth century, most of the analyses about Haitians living in the DominicanRepublic linked Haitians to this industry. The extensive work by Moya Pons, ElBatey (1986), for example, provides a description of living conditions within asugarcane cutting community. Murphy (1991) has described how sugarcaneproduction adjusted to integrate foreign labour. Other works have dealt withHaitians labouring in the rice industry and/or coffee industries (Castillo 1978;Ferrán and Pessar 1991; Lozano 1993). Martinez (1995) has discussedrural-to-rural migration among Haitian cane cutters. While these provideexcellent material for understanding the on-going situation in which manyHaitians working in agriculture find themselves, these necessarily do not deal with results of recent market changes. Other writings that comprise the field one might32 call “Haitians in the Dominican Republic” have treated border issues (Derby 1994; Traub-Werner 2008; Turits 2002), sex work (Brennan 2004; De Moya 2002), ordynamics of international population movement and globalization (Gregory 2006; Lozano 1992; Smucker and Murray 2004). These works that go beyond the strictscope of agricultural production reflect changes in the role of Haitians in theDominican Republic, and most of these discuss identity construction through theuse of difference. Though the aforementioned works provide helpful insight into historicaland current aspects of life for some Haitians, little has been written describing thelived experiences of Haitians in an urban area. This article contributes to a morenuanced understanding of Haitians who live in the primary urban area of theDominican Republic, i.e. Santo Domingo, complete with points of unity anddisjuncture.4 Recent attempts to address the gap between scholarship andexperience include works from a human rights and/or applied research perspective (SJRM 2008; Wooding and Moseley-Williams 2004; Wooding and Sangro 2008), one piece based on the overall topic of Haitians in an urban context (Silié, Segura,and Dore Cabral 2002), and a book examining dynamics of an urbanneighbourhood (Baez Evertsz 2001). These otherwise solid works suffer the same shortcoming of earlier work (save for Silié et al. 2002), equating the term“Haitian” with one group, albeit statistically the largest and most frequentlydepicted in anti-Haitian sentiments.Anti-HaitianismScholars treating Haitians in the Dominican Republic have usually relegated anti-Haitianism to the realm of ideas. If they proffer any description, they useterms like “ideology” (Torres-Saillant 2006; Matibag, this volume) or “prejudice”(Martinez; Derby and Turits 2005). These authors describe how an ideologicalconstruction creates difference between two populations as closed units, thusessentializing Dominicans and Haitians and pathologizing the latter. Though Iagree in part with their assessment, they appear to ignore the behaviour, i.e. thepraxis/praxis.One variance on this theme is the work by Sagás, who describesanti-Haitianism as an ideology, but also as:an ideological method of political control…directed not onlytoward Haiti and Haitians, but also toward Afro-Caribbeanmembers of Dominican society, who tend to be poor, forming thesubordinate class. Antihaitianism denies dark-skinned citizens,and the poor generally, their own sociocultural space and33 intimidates them from making demands on otherwise participatingin politics (2000:4).Therefore, I define anti-Haitianism as a constellation of ideas and practicesnegatively affecting people (as a person or a group) from Haiti, their descendents,and those perceived as being as belonging to one of these groups, whether or notthey actually belong, and specifically because of their ascribed membership. Thisdiffers throughout time and space. Though the origins of anti-Haitianism in the Dominican Republic lie mainly(but not entirely) in the nineteenth century, manifestations of anti-Haitianismbegin in the twentieth century. The most referenced event is the 1937 killing nearthe border of Haiti and the Dominican Republic, where the ideology becameofficially state-sanctioned, and thousands of people perceived as Haitians werekilled under orders from President Trujillo (see Cambeira, this volume; Derby, this volume; Derby and Turits 2005; Sagás 2000; Turits 2002). Another notable eventoccurred in 1962, when President Balaguer napalmed Haitians andHaitian-Dominicans in the rural hamlet of Palma Sola for demanding land rights. The other major demonstration of anti-Haitianism relates to batey-s, sugar canecutting and processing areas usually found in areas around Barahona and SanPedro de Macorís. Though Haitians have been working at these sites since theearly twentieth century, only in the past 25 years have human rights groups takenan interest in the forced recruitment,5 often of deplorable working conditions, anddeportations of batey workers, a population largely (but not strictly) consisting ofHaitians (see Americas Watch 1992). The Consejo Estatal de Azúcar (CEA)controlled most of these areas until the sell-off of these lands to private owners inthe 1990s.These examples have two factors in common. First, each of these impliesinvolvement of the Dominican state. Secondly, the geography of these eventslocates Haitians on the border, in rural areas, or in batey-s, meaning that there is aspatial element of fixedness associated with these earlier forms of anti-Haitianism. Thirdly, those people targeted by these actions were often linked to agriculturalproduction. With the elabouration of official, state anti-Haitianism during theTrujillo and Balaguer regimes, clearly, violent and non-violent acts ofanti-Haitianism occurred frequently among non-state actors and beyond thecountryside or border lands. Nevertheless, under neoliberalism the state hasbecome a less visible and active participant in anti-Haitian fervor and, as I willshow, urban spaces have now become important sites to study the content andsignificance of anti-Haitianism in immigrants’ daily lives as well as for34 understanding how anti-Haitianism is now practiced. To date, however, nosignificant historical scholarship has dealt with this topic (though Torres-Saillant2006 provides a small piece). After changes in the Dominican economy, though,anti-Haitianism linked so openly to the state could not be sustained.The Rise and Fall of Sugar as Economic BackboneThe important role of sugar in the Dominican economy came late, comparedto other countries in Latin America. The economy of Cuba, a major sugarproducer in the nineteenth century, suffered a setback due to the Ten Years’ War,which contributed to the growth of the Dominican industry (Howard 2001). Thisoccurred through the purchasing of large plantations, thanks to the flight of foreign capital from Cuba to the Dominican Republic, and the growth of large sugarentities in the beginning of the twentieth century (Betances 1995). The labour ofBlack British and French migrants from other Caribbean islands, had alreadyplayed a role in reducing the number of Dominicans participating in the growingsugar industry, a switch fostered by the US occupation and commandeering ofsugar production. But due to the Haitian- and Dominican-sponsored braceroprogram, in addition to voluntary migration6, Haitians began to replace bothDominicans and Afro Antillean workers in this industry (Martinez 1999). Thisextremely cheap labour, combined with favorable market conditions, boostedprofits.Until the mid 1970s, the sugar Dominican industry thrived under the controlof the Dominican government and sugar baron families like the Vicinis. While thecountry could not compete with production on the massive land areas oftop-producers Brazil and India, the Dominican Republic saw a 40% increase inrevenue from 1961 to 1976. This was due partially to increased production andrising prices of sugar on the global market. Unfortunately for the sugar barons andfor the Dominican state that regulated production to its benefit, these days ofprosperity were numbered, and a new era was about to begin on the island. As hasbeen described by others (see Hoffnung-Garskof 2008; Lozano 2001), profitsfrom Dominican sugar production began significant decline in the late 1970s dueto subsidies in other major sugar-producing countries, which put downwardeconomic pressure on national production, and consequently, political pressure on the state to usher in changes. From Sugar to “Sweetheart”From the 1970s to the 1990s, a series of factors shifted the Dominicaneconomy away from sugar production. Starting in the 1970s, with the state losingmoney on sugar production, some lands were shifted to production of other35 agricultural goods like pineapples, rice, coffee, and tobacco (Lozano 1997;Lozano 2001). In the 1980s, the Dominican Republic, like many other countries in the hemisphere, faced pressure from multilateral loan institutions that pushed for: “a reduction in trade barriers, for floating interest and exchangerates, for cuts in public employment, price controls, and industrialsubsidies, and for creation of export processing zones exempt fromtaxation, labour laws, and environmental protection” (Lozano2008).The government under President Blanco and later President Balaguercapitulated to these pressures from the World Bank and International MonetaryFund. Also during this time, cane cutting became more mechanized, reducing theneed for manual labourers. Additionally, overall production decreased droppingthirty percent from 1981 to 1991, and again from 1991 to 2001 (FAO 2009). Allsigns pointed to the fact that the importance of sugar and of the model ofDominican economy that had so long depended on it was declining.At the same time, new sources of income bolstered the economy. From 1996 to 1997, cigar cheroot exports jumped seven hundred percent, dwarfing theamounts of all other agricultural products. In the mid 1970s, Gulf & Westernconstructed the Casa de Campo, an extravagant resort with internationally rankedgolf courses and its own airport. The Fanjul family, which had been (andcontinues to be) a major exporter of Dominican sugar to the US, purchased this inthe mid 1980s. Over the next two decades, all-inclusive resorts popped up alongbeaches and increased numbers of cruise-ships arrived at Dominican ports. By theyear 2000, tourism had become the country’s largest earner of foreign money(Icon Group 2000). Along with these changes also came a large increase in sextourism in the country, where Dominicans could market themselves as“sweethearts” to foreigners on vacation (see Brennan 2004; Padilla 2007). As if to enshrine the change from an economy based upon sugar to one diversified alongthe lines of global capitalism, President Leonel Fernández, in his investiturespeech in 1996, spoke of the challenges of implementing changes of globalizationto stimulate “progress and modernization” through “tourism, free trade zones,international finance transactions, and putting in place the GATT agreements”(Fernández 1996).The 2000sEconomically, several changes marked the past decade. Leonel Fernández,taking back the presidency from Hipólito Mejía in the 2004 elections, continuedgoverning in his style from his earlier term, marked by a transition away from the36 heavy-handed authoritarianism of the past (while still maintaining a cult ofpersonality) to rule according to more market-oriented policies. State and privateinterests came together to negotiate the opening of free-trade zones. Theysubsequently flourished, though the industry posted lower numbers in 2007.(Schwerdtfeger 2008). Due to the damage of Hurricanes Georges (1998) andJeanne (2004) and with an increased demand for apartment buildings in SantoDomingo, the construction industry has grown significantly, including nearly a23% growth in 2006 (Jimenez 2007). Cigars continue to bring in almost as muchmoney as all other agricultural products combined (FAO 2009). Commerce andcommunications, along with the service, transport, and hotel industries also posted significant growth in the past few years (Schwerdtfeger 2008). This boom incommunication included the opening of Orange (France Telecom) in 2007 andViva (US-based Trilogy International Partners) in 2008 to compete with Tricom(opened in 1988) and Codetel (originally of the Anglo Canadian TelephoneCompany; opened in 1930). Currently, tourism and international remittancescurrently bring in the largest amount of money to the country (World Fact Book2009). As the Fanjul family’s investment in a resort stands as a marker from old tonew capitalism in the last decades of the 20th century, there are similar markers forthe first decade of the 21st century. One of these is the implementation in 2007 ofthe Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA). The second includes the diversification of the Vicini family’s businesses. Originally establishing sugar mills in Azua and Ocoa in 1876, and quicklybecoming one of the most wealthy and powerful families in the DominicanRepublic from sugar, the family now deals in food and drink retail, energy,finances and insurance, communications, tourism, and real estate (Grupo Vicini2009). With all these changes, it is no surprise that the dynamics of labourinsertion of Haitians in the Dominican Republic has also shifted.New SubjectivitiesAt this point, I am moving towards an understanding what it means to beHaitian in the Dominican Republic in the first decade of the 21st century. Since theshift away from sugar (including the privatization of the Dominican sugar industry in 1998) and agriculture, much of this migratory population shifted toward thecapital (Wooding and Moseley-Williams 2004). Furthermore, almost all Haitiansnow migrate directly to major cities or resort towns. Consequently, I examinethose in Santo Domingo, the capital of the Dominican Republic.37 To further this understanding requires two parts of a sociologicalimagination, that of the (new) subjectivities, i.e., the varieties of human experience that have come to prevalence, and how they are related to each other. Afterexplaining these two parts, I will provide small descriptions and case studies ofsome of these.When considering Haitians in contemporary Santo Domingo, they can bedivided into those:1.Working in the informal economy or fringes of the formal economy,2.Attending universities in the Dominican capital,3.Working in a professional or semi-professional capacity, 4.Of a business elite.Listing these groups does not accurately describe the model of Haitians inSanto Domingo, though. Both Dominicans and Haitians make a class and/or racedistinction when describing Haitians in the capital. One Dominican man namedPedro succinctly quipped, “a Haitian is not the same as a poor Haitian” (personalcommunication). Furthermore, it has been observed that both dark-skinnedDominican citizens have been rounded up and deported as a “Haitian”, and thatelite people from Haiti are often not considered Haitian. This points to thetraditional racial and economic divisions, indicated in numerous Haitianproverbs.8 Therefore, the sociological imagination includes a two-tieredframework. The lower classes include those in the lower sections of the formaleconomy and in the informal economy. These people represent the continuation,in the urban context, of those individuals commonly associated with the so-calledHaitian problem and the aforementioned anti-Haitianism. Above the apparent line of acceptability are the university students, the professionals, and the elite. Persons in both classes are linked to capital flows in distinct manners.Lower Socio-Economic ClassesThe first group of Haitians consists of those who work on the fringes of theformal economy or in the informal economy9. This is, by far, the most diversegroup in terms of employment and the largest in number. Though Murphy (1990)has described the way Dominican tricicleros and lechugeros form part of theinformal economy, little information has been compiled on this as it pertains toHaitians (Baez Evertsz 2001 is one exception). Silié et al. (2002) in their researchon the topic of Haitian migration in general states this group includes day38 labourers, petty commerce, artisanal work, domestic service, and tourism10. Consistent with my findings, they describe this entire group as:1.male (72%),2.between 20-40 years old (73.4%),3.arriving on their own, or with the help of family members (72%), 4.living in the country less than 11 years (72%), and5.having little formal schooling.Within Santo Domingo, I identify seventeen types of occupations within thelower classes. These include of phone card vendors, flavored ice vendors, clothesvendors, petty commerce vendors, hot food vendors, sweet cart vendors, ambulant sweets vendors, agricultural vendors, moneychangers, a population that has beendescribed in a similar setting (Ulysses 2008) as informal commercial importers11,construction workers, domestic workers, sex workers, pica pollo workers, storefront barkers, artisans, and hair braiders. I divide these into those selling tangiblecommodities (food, phone cards, etc.) and those selling their labour-power12.Vendors of Tangible CommoditiesPhone card vendorsOne of the major factors involved in the communications boom in theDominican Republic relates to the spread of cellular phone usage. People from allclasses, like counterparts in other countries, use cellular phones to communicate. Perhaps due to paperwork burdens or perhaps due to prohibitive cost, someacquire cellular phones instead of installing landlines at home, essentially makinga technological evolutionary leap. Furthermore, operating a prepaid telephone ischeaper (and more flexible) than a monthly plan, meaning that thousands of people need to add money to their phone account. Customers may add to their accountbalance at company kiosks around the city, but many opt instead to purchasephysical phone cards of varying amounts ranging from twenty to three hundredpesos.Distribution of these cards occurs in several ways. The main companies(Claro, Viva, Orange, and Tricom) sell their cards in bulk from distributioncentres, mainly to intermediaries rather than individual customers. This person isusually Dominican, as it now requires someone to show a cédula or proof of legalresidence in the country. However, some Haitians may purchase from thesecentres if they have been doing so for a significant length of time such that the39 centre’s employees recognize them. Often, Dominicans will sell cards in smallerbunches to colmado-s 13, but some will drive around the city and sell to phone card vendors from Haiti. At least one Dominican sells large quantities of cards in frontof a government building under the guise of operating a different type ofgovernment enterprise, and many Haitian card vendors purchase from him.Before the vendor can purchase and then sell the cards, he or she mustacquire the initial capital. This may involve investing profits from previous cardsales. However, many people do not have this foundation will borrow money from trusted family members or friends, paying them back in installments. Then, thevendor purchases cards at a rate that, when sold to the consumer, provides a fewpesos profit to the intermediary and six to eight pesos profit to the vendor. Manyvendors, some of who wear caps or vests with company colours and logos, standaround major intersections of the city. This way, as people sit in traffic, they canbeckon to the vendor by calling out “tarjeta”. The vendor approaches the vehicle,the customer makes a request, and the transaction is completed. A similarexchange occurs among pedestrian customers. Sweet cart vendorsAnother common sight in Santo Domingo is the vendor with a sweet cart, orbak paletèl. These people sell individual packages of crackers, cookies, chips,gum, hard candies, suckers, and occasionally chocolate. Most of these people alsohave an insulated container from which the sell coffee that was made in their homethat morning.Starting or maintaining a bak paletèl also requires capital. As with phonecards, this money comes in the form of loans or reinvestment from previousventures. The vendor, either a man or woman, must purchase a stand (made of awooden box to hold merchandise and the bottom of a stroller for movement). Next, the person must acquire their product. Vendors usually purchase largepackages (which can be opened to sell individual units) from major retailers, butmay purchase from a larger colmado if necessary, and sell individual units at amarked up price. At the end of the working day, the person stores the cart andmerchandise. The storage sight may be a parking garage or warehouse paid to thesecurity guard, and usually costs 25 pesos per night. Dynamics of paletèl sales can be as varied as the products sold. Vendorsmay have a regular location where they park the cart and sell, or they may walkthrough the city in search of highly trafficked areas and clients, known as sikile (tocirculate). One vendor commented that “if you don’t circulate, you won’t sellanything” (anonymous, personal communication 2009). The product is usually40 consumed by Dominican passers-by. Clearly, most exchanges include cash, but aregular customer may be able to purchase on credit (with no interest). Occasionally, police officers pilfer items.Agricultural VendorsAgricultural vendors include those people who sell raw fruit or fruit plates,fruit juice, coconut water and the meat of the nut, and sugar cane (juice or sticks). Fruit sold raw or as plates may include bananas, mangoes, papayas, pineapples, ormandarins, depending on the season. Honey may also be added to the fruit plate. Fruit juices usually include orange, key limes, or grapefruit, depending on theseason.Such an operation requires more capital than the other ventures. Though it is not uncommon for someone to borrow money to start the enterprise, someevidence exists which points to a developmental cycle, whereby people whopreviously sold their labour power would save money and invest in agriculturalvending. Once initial money is acquired, people must purchase their tricicleta 14 or their cart, followed by a purchase of agricultural products. Most people buy theirproduce from the Mercado Nuevo15 in Santo Domingo and pay extra for a carropúblico to transport their fruit back to the depo 16 . Those who sell batidas, or fruitsmoothies, will have a blender, run on either a battery or through an ACconnection near where they park their stand.All vendors usually have one or two locations in the city where they sellduring the day (usually between 7am and 5pm), and may have had to askpermission from or pay a neighbor or business owner for the right to sell there. Like paletèl vendors, they operate almost completely on cash, with credit beingextended occasionally to repeat customers in need. Their customer base mainlyconsists of Dominican passers-by.Emergent CommonalitiesSimilar depictions of occupations, partial commodity chains, and salescould be made for the remaining types within this category. Within all of these,several commonalities emerge. First, the means of production of thesecommodities are controlled by private entities. Second, commodities pass fromthe producer to one or more Dominican intermediaries before reaching the Haitianvendor. Third, most of the consumers of these products are Dominicans. Thesignificance of these will be discussed later.41 Vendors of labour-PowerConstruction WorkersConstruction workers form the largest part of the manual labour force ofHaitians in the urban areas17. Within the industry, there are a number of positions,from site management to mixing concrete. Haitians occupy all positions withinthis framework, but clearly they carry out the majority of the low-skilled manuallabour (SJRM 2008). Though both Haitians and Dominicans work on public andprivate projects, fewer Haitians work on public projects than on private ones. Haitians engaged in such work are particularly of interest, given how they areworking on projects involving transnational capital and national pride, like thenew subway being built throughout the city (the Metro), the Plaza de Bellas Artes,and restoration of buildings around the Plaza Colón. Recruitment occurs eitherthrough on-site worker solicitation, or through the personal connections someonehas with an existing employee.It is not common for Haitians to earn the legal minimum wage for daylabour, which could explain why so many sites violate the Dominican labour lawthat requires a minimum of 80% Dominican presence on any project 18. They work more days and more hours per day without further compensation than legallypermitted, and frequently are not paid or are picked up by immigration on the daybefore they get paid.Domestic ServantsDomestic servitude operates under the opposite gender bias fromconstruction, as it is almost completely made up of women workers19. Thesepeople make their living by taking care of one or more of the following: cleaning,cooking, childcare, and other duties related to social reproduction (Wooding andSangro 2008). They may work only for the day and then return home, or they maybe given a room within the residence to sleep. Their employers may be from theDominican Republic, from the US, or from other countries, including Haiti. Thedomestic servants are legally accorded certain labour rights (including overtimepay, work-related health coverage, and certain provisions for paid leave),however, they are not regularly respected. Wooding and Sangro (2008) contendthat part of their continued vulnerability relates to this populations “invisibility,”as they labour in private spaces.Sex WorkersThis group includes people who offer sexualized services in exchange formoney20. This may take several different forms. Some women may stake out42 regular spaces on Avenidas Independencia and Duarte or in ParqueIndependencia. These people could be considered street walkers. After theyfinish with a client, they may return to the same spot or return home. Some women work at strip clubs and leave with clients after their shift. Others still may sit atrestaurants, bars, or casinos where tourists frequently pass. Finally, there are some bordellos in Santo Domingo, where women are there for nothing more than sexualwork. Any of these may give out their cellular phone number to a client afterwardto keep regular customers.These workers, save for perhaps those at bordellos, have complete say inwhom they take on as clients and determine what they will do for what amount ofmoney. Clients may be Dominican, Haitian, or other foreigners, and it seems to bethat Dominicans pay the least, other foreigners pay the most, and Haitians paysomewhere in between21. In addition to differences in nationality, geographic area relates to the amount a woman may earn per exchange. Despite what seems to be adegree of choice and power for the women, many women suffer mistreatment,including insults, refusal of payment, and occasionally physical abuse. Further,many of these workers feel compelled to continue because they are already singlemothers and because the money earned in a month from jobs they might get (withthe limited formal schooling or marketable skills they do have) would pale incomparison to what they make within two hours of sex work with a foreigner.More Emergent CommonalitiesLike those selling tangible commodities, those selling their labour-poweralso work using capital of private origins (save for some construction projects). Similarly, consumers may be Dominican, but they may also be foreigners of anynation.Extending the discussion to include all these cases from the lower classes,several other commonalities emerge. First, these described cases demonstrate that their financial origins are no longer based upon the Dominican state, and certainlynot upon sugar or agricultural production. Second, the aspect of capitalism thatbrings producers of value (in this case, Haitians) and consumers (mostlynon-Haitians) together in a market context of commodity exchange provides aspace where mental conceptions and social relations that stigmatize Haitians arealtered. In other words, though one may complain about the product, no onecomplains about the vendor during the exchange. Finally, by way of a comment, itshould be stated that Dominicans are also in the lower rungs of the formaleconomy and in the informal economy. Schwerdtfeger (2007) posted that 56% ofthe eligible Dominican work force was involved in the informal economy. But not43 only are Dominicans in the informal economy, Haitians are also in the upperclasses and formal economy.The Upper ClassesAs mentioned above, the upper classes include university students,professionals, and the business elite. No significant research has been conductedamong either Haitian professionals or members of the business elite in theDominican Republic, and due to limited research focus, only a few comments canbe added here. The business elite is almost unimaginable in the DominicanRepublic, but significant parts of Dominican industry receive contributions fromHaitian-owned enterprises (Edwin Paraison, personal communication, 2008), andefforts have recently begun to foster connections between Haitian elite and theHaitian lower classes in the Dominican Republic (Paraison 2008). Also, there is agrowing number of Haitians who are working professionally in the DominicanRepublic. Professions may include graphic designers or artists, academic orartistic instructors, office workers, or small business owners. This group has adegree of overlap with the category of university students, as some people workprofessionally while completing post-secondary schooling.University StudentsThe second largest group of Haitians in Santo Domingo includes those whoattend universities in the city. These students, mostly 21-29 years of age, havefinished their secondary schooling in Haiti and moved to Santo Domingo to earnbaccalaureate or professional degrees. These students may have received ascholarship to study, may work in a semi-professional or pre-professional mannerto pay for school, may combine the two forms of support, or draw upon othermeans. Lodging is largely acquired through rental properties, usually paid for byfamilies in Haiti. All study in the Dominican Republic on a student visa, and mostof them say they do not plan on staying in the country after completing theircoursework. Though they have the legal ability to travel back and forth betweenhome and host countries, all but the wealthiest must forego travel except in casesof holidays or emergencies. Most Haitians who study in the Dominican Republic attend privateuniversities (Sonia Adames Nuñez, personal communication, 2007) who arefrequently unwilling to share information about Haitians at their school, thusmaking obtaining accurate information about student populations difficult. Thenumber of students has grown significantly in the past few years, with a reportedincrease from 4,000 in 2004 to almost 5,000 in 2005, to 11,000 in 2006, to nearly17,000 in 2008 (Alter Presse 2004; D’Oleo 2008; Dominican Today 2006; Nuñez44 2008). Students attend private institutions, like the Universidad de Acción ProEducación y Cultura (UNAPEC), la Universidad Dominicana Organización yMétodo (O&M), the Instituto Tecnológico de Santo Domingo (INTEC), theUniversidad Católica, the Pontificia Universidad Católica Madre y Maestra(PUCCM), the Universidad Tecnológica de Santiago (UTESA), the eliteUniversidad Iberoamericana (UNIBE), among others, or the state-runAutonomous University (UASD). Haitian students study an array of topics, but the majority study medicine. Some departments within the UASD host a larger numbers of Haitian nationals,most notably, the health sciences faculty, which hosts 123 of the 164 Haitianstudents, followed distantly by the sciences (14), agronomy (11) and thehumanities (5) (UASD 2006). Though the data is not complete, D’Oleo (2008)confirms that most Haitian students study medicine, followed by BusinessAdministration and Computer Science, with fewer still in Engineering and HotelManagement.Capitalism clearly is linked to the rise of this population. In one sense, whatthese students represent is an extension of their family’s capital. A student and hisor her family organize themselves to manage the governmental and institutionalobstacles (i.e. visa, legal documents, and translation of Haitian accreditations) andpay for tuition and living expenses outside of Haiti, thus offering money for theinitial stage of capital accumulation. In the second stage, students enroll and studyat universities. This clearly is an investment of intellectual labour, and the choiceof students’ majors shows a connection to the insular labour market. Finally, thegoal is to secure gainful employment in the labour market22 (on the island orelsewhere) and generate money for the family. This completes one cycle of capital accumulation through a process of migration.Together with the lower classes, the university students and the rest of theupper classes show how variations in capital flows relate to difference withinpopulations. However, in this new phase of capitalism, other realms beyond thesocial also become heterogeneous.Other Neoliberal GesturesWithin this current political economic moment, capital flows have changed. As has been shown above, these new flows reveal new migratory populations andnew relations to nature. Beyond this, two additional developments related toneoliberal processes arise: a new anti-Haitianism and pro-Haitian advocacygroups.45 The New Anti-HaitianismPositing a new anti-Haitianism does not mean erasing an older one. Turits(2002) argued that anti-Haitianism “has only grown and, above all, diffused during the last 60 years, as Haitian migrants to Dominican sugar zones and otherareas—mostly far from the frontier regions —actually increased in number afterthe massacre” (592, emphasis mine). This being said, older models still continue,with much of the ideological element remaining the same. In a conversation aboutmy research with a cleaning woman named Mercy 23, she commented that:it’s easy to find the Haitians here. They have dark black skin, theyspeak Spanish poorly, they smell really bad, and they have theirown style of music and dance that is different from us Dominicans. Just look around construction sites because they take Dominicansjobs there, but whatever you do, be careful (personalcommunication 2007).She further recounted how once, on a guagua, she sat next to a Haitian whospoke with her. She explained that he used magic to control her mind so that hecould steal money from her purse (which was on her lap) without her realizing it. Mercy’s commentary and bus story highlight the negative opinion and stereotypesthat transmogrify Haitians into deviant and dangerous people who are clearlydistinct from Dominicans and who are linked to magic and to wealth taken fromDominicans given to Haitians (c.f., Derby 1994). The ideological component, nolonger a state ideology, is diffused through fairly recent ultranationalist literature(including the work of Balaguer), school textbooks, and news media (Sagás 2000).What’s new in the new anti-Haitianism relates to the nature of statepractices, the authorship of new practices, and the populations affected. On onehand, the state apparatus has targeted lower-class Haitians. Whereas previousDominican governments have actively participated in bringing Haitians into thecountry, including the renewal of residency permits for those cutting sugarcane, inthe past two decades, the Dominican state has become more active in formalizingthe illegality and marginalization of Haitian migrants. Starting in 1991 withDecreto 233-91 by President Balaguer and occurring again in 1996-97 and 1999,mass expulsions by people perceived by skin colour to be Haitian were carried outwith regard to whether people were legal or illegal, Haitian or Dominican. Thistrend continued in the early 21st century. Regarding documents, the 2004immigration law authorized the creation of the so-called Pink Book, wherenon-residents receive a pink certificate registering birth and residents receive awhite certificate. Combined with the new Constitution of 2010 formally denying46 citizenship to children of those “in-transit” or illegal residents (despite theinclusion of a jus solis clause), this ensures that a new generation of ethnicHaitians will be denied full citizenship in the Dominican Republic. In “Benito,” itis common knowledge among Dominicans and Haitians that the police fromseveral precincts may drive through after dark, stop anyone (but almost alwaysHaitians) on the streets, and give them the choice between spending a night in jailor paying anywhere from 50-500 pesos. On the other hand, the significant numberof tourists, NGO and government workers, and other professionals foreigners areprotected by a new Dominican police branch, Policía Turística (POLITUR), toprotect and serve the tourists (and de facto the aforementioned groups) and theareas they frequent. Though it is not uncommon for these people to live in thecountry on expired visas (and simply pay a fee when they leave), there have beenno reported attacks of these people being caught up in illegal immigrant sweeps 24.at this points to is how the state targets poor, low-skilled foreigners whileprotecting the wealthy, professional ones.Another facet of the new anti-Haitianism includes the fact that morenon-state actors are involved. While earlier actions by non-state actors occurred in concert with the state apparatus (e.g. the 1937 massacre), many current practicesoccur without active state involvement. Several fruit and sweets vendors havereported how some Dominicans blatantly steal merchandise and then becomeaggressive and shout anti-Haitian slurs when confronted. In 2008, a Dominicanthreatened Robert, a Haitian juice vendor, with a machete if he did not returnchange for a bill that the Dominican had not given to the vendor, cursing him allthe time as “maldito haitiano”. Robert paid the 50 pesos rather than suffer a fatalmachete blow. In the most gruesome incident in recent memory, in spring 2009, aHaitian construction worker allegedly killed his boss after he was refusedpayment. Later, a group of family members and friends of the victim encircled theworker and beheaded him. One person was arrested in connection with the crime,and rather than implement anti-hate legislation, the Dominican state identified theact as solely an isolated incident, and failed to take further action. These andsimilar episodes are recounted by many Haitians in Santo Domingo, marking it assystemic but not institutional.Finally, all classes of Haitian populations in the city are being affected byanti-Haitianism. University students from across various campuses have reportedbeing mistreated in the academic setting (D’Oleo 2008), including speakingpoorly of Haiti, speaking poorly to them, treating them as inferiors, and beingrejected because of their skin colour. Even light-skinned students in elite settings47 have had professors lecture the class that they “should not be like the Haitians [andcheat in class]” (Elizabeth Voltaire, personal communication, 2009).This last aspect of the new anti-Haitianism again reveals the changing sameof the pathology associated with being Haitian. The two other parts of the newanti-Haitianism bring back the issue of neoliberalism. With the state limiting itself to the facilitation of generation and accumulation of capital, it is logical to havedifferential applications of state power toward migrant groups, protecting thoseimmediately beneficial in a market setting and excluding those with lower-valuedskills in order to more easily exploit and extract surplus value from them. Additionally, it makes sense for the state to maintain efficient control over privatecitizens while ensuring it does not formally dictate how people should act in dailylife, even if it is systematically racist.New AdvocacyAs stated above, the new capital flows associated with the changes in thecontemporary Dominican political economy, allow for new spaces for advocacy. In addition to groups like the Movimiento de Mujeres Dominico-Haitianas(MUDHA) that serve subsequent generations of ethnic Haitians, severalorganizations work with first-generation Haitians in the lower and upper classes. The Jesuit Service for Refugees and Migrants (SJRM) was created after the 1991coup d’état in Haiti to “accompany refugees and forced migrants in their personaland legal processes for empowerment so that they may constitute social subjects,recognized as people and incorporated into society with projects for their ownlives, both as individuals and as a collective” (SJRM 2010). In addition to legalcounsel and representation, the SJRM organizes conferences, conducts andsupports advocacy through research, and offers course in Kreyòl and Spanish. Atalmost every university campus, there are Haitian student organizations. Some act as a social outlet, while others work to support new arrivals to the country and giveadvice on legal paperwork processes. There is a blanket organization, theFundación Universitaria Socio Cultural de los Haitianos Activos en la RepúblicaDominicana (FUSCHARD), which coordinates with groups from manyuniversities in Santo Domingo as well as in Santiago. In addition to socialfunctions, it serves to “preserve the rights of its members” and assist students in“meeting their goals and helping, to the extent afforded by law, Haitians living indifficult conditions in the [Dominican Republic]”.48 ConclusionIn conclusion, the changes in the contemporary Dominican politicaleconomy reveal how neoliberalism connects with daily life. The origin and flowsof capital no longer are associated with the state but with private and/orinternational entities, as the apparatus reduces its activities according to capitalistlogic. Shifts in the productive elements of the economy allow for new Haitianmigrant insertion, both for the lower and upper classes. Capitalism allows fornovel advocacy and identities (including providing space for NGOs to take overthe role of the state as protector of rights), but it renders anti-Haitianism morediffuse, making social and historical injustices more difficult to address.Afterward: Remarks after the January 12 EarthquakeThe island of Hispaniola experienced a 7.0 earthquake. Some remarksrelated to these topics bear mentioning, specifically relating to migration and toanti-Haitianism.In the two weeks directly after the earthquake, significant numbers ofHaitians crossed the border in both directions. Lower class Haitians traveled to see if their family and friends were still alive or at least sent money. Haitian medicalstudents at Dominican universities traveled to Jimaní to provide support. Haitianprofessionals were either donating their time as translators in Haiti, in Jimaní, andin Santo Domingo, or facilitating evacuation of family and friends. Returning toSanto Domingo, I found a notable increase in Haitians. Everywhere I went, ineven affluent areas, Kreyòl and/or French was much more prevalent. While manyupper class Haitians came for a vacation or to “de-stress”, some people camelooking for opportunities to continue studying or to work. Others still werehelicoptered in by international NGOs (like Médecins Sans Frontières) as medicalrefugees. Clearly Haitians were participating in novel migratory behavior, andalmost exclusively using private (rather than state) capital.With this influx, contrary to what one might think, not only were theresurprisingly few negative reactions, but also there were several gestures to thecontrary. Upon learning of my work with medical refugees, Dominicans regularlyprovided sympathetic comments that “it must be so sad there”. One popularmorning radio show castigated many callers for being anti-Haitian and added thatpeople needed to accept and celebrate Sonia Pierre as a “national hero”25. Thisgood will extended to institutions, as well. Dominicans and Haitians workedtogether at the SONAPI base in Haiti for the Dominican Red Cross. Also,President Fernández intimated that the UASD may forgive tuition payments forHaitian students for that semester. It seemed like change was in the air.49 NOTES1. “Benito” refers to an area north of the Zona Colonial, south of Avenida Mexico,west of Calle Enriquillo, and east of Emile Proudhomme. The term Pequeño Haití isused less frequently and ambivalently by Haitians, being more often invoked byDominicans attempting to denigrate the area. Greater Santo Domingo includes theDistricto Nacional, i.e., the city of Santo Domingo, and Santo Domingo province, i.e.,the areas immediately to the north, west, and east of the city. 2.A chacabana, also called a guayabera, is a shirt with four pockets in the front,usually white and short-sleeved.3. By commodity chains, I refer to “the overall group of economic agents (or therelevant activities of those agents) that contribute directly to the determination of a finalproduct” (Tallec and Bockel 2005)4. For a related work on unity and disjuncture in a US urban context, see Glick 1972).5. Of particular interest is the 1960s bracero program between the Haitian andDominican governments, whereby Haitian workers were sent to the DR, and a portion ofwages kept by the Haitian government for workers’ reintegration after the harvest.6. These plantations were organized first under direction of foreign capital,subsequently by Generalissimo Trujillo, and finally, after 1961, under the Dominicanstate (Lozano 1997).7. My thanks to former Ambassador Guy Alexandre and former Haitian ConsulEdwin Paraison for helping me identify these categories.8. Two examples of these are: “the cockroach is never right in front of the chicken”,pointing to the idea of “might makes right”, and “a rich black person is a milat, a poormilat is black”. Milat in Kreyòl refers to the colonial constructed racial category ofoffspring produced from a member of the white planter or administrative classes and ablack slave or black member of the affranchise class.9. I follow the model of Portes (1994), Itzigsohn (2000), and Gregory (2006) in myunderstanding that the informal economy in some way articulates with the formaleconomy. 10.I do not include tourism, as Haitians in Santo Domingo do not significantlyparticipate in this sector.11. My thanks to Prof. Gerald Murray for reminding me of the existence of this groupearly in my research. 12. I recognize that in both cases, labour-power is involved, but in the former, its value is fused with that of a commodity for sale whereas in the latter, the labour-power itself isbeing sold.13.Colmado-s are small corner stores, elsewhere called bodegas.14. A tricicleta is a full-sized tricycle with a cart on the front for holding oranges. Other materials include a juicer, cups and straws, a cooler for ice, and containers forholding juice.50 15. Mercado Nuevo is one of the major receptor sites in Santo Domingo foragricultural goods that are grown across the country. 16.A carro público, or public car, is a common form of public transport, each whichhas its specific routes. A depo is where people store their tricicleta or cart andmerchandise while they are not working.17. Some of this material is based upon my research, but much of it comes from thereport by the Jesuit Service (SJRM 2008).18. As of 2008, the minimum wage was 414 pesos per day, approximately US$12.19. Some of this material is based upon my research, but much of it comes from thereport by Wooding and Sangro (2008). In this section, I do not deal with rèstavèk-s, orchild servants from Haiti, though the practice does extend across the island. 20.This section unfortunately limits its discussion to male-female sex work encounters. See Brennan 2004 for more, and Padilla 2007 for a good discussion of male-male sexwork encounters.21. As of 2009, amounts for services ranged from a low of 500 pesos to 1500 pesosand beyond.22. Though an extensive discussion cannot be provided here, the demands of labour inHaiti fall squarely in the medical field, agricultural management, and secondarily insmall business and computer work.23. All names in this article are pseudonyms unless the person is acting in a publiccapacity, as in a politician.24. Reportedly in 2008, a West African professional was picked up and deported twice to Haiti, though he had no ties to the country, other than being associated with it by thefact that he had dark skin.25. The day prior, Secretary of State Clinton awarded Ms. Pierre and several otherwomen across the globe with awards for their outstanding contribution to women’s rights in their respective countries.REFERENCESBaez Evertsz, Franc. 2001 : Vecinos y Extraños. Migrantes haitianos y relacionesinterétnicas en un barrio popular de Santo Domingo. República Dominicana: ServicioJesuita a Refugiados y Migrantes.Betances, Emilio. 1995: Social Classes and the Origins of the Modern State: theDominican Republic, 1844-1930. Latin American Perspectives 22(3):20-40.Brennan, Denise. 2004: What’s Love Got to Do With It? Transnational Desires and SexTourism in theDominican Republic. Durham: Duke University Press.Castillo, Jose Del. 1978 : La inmigración de braceros azucareros en la RepúblicaDominicana, 1900-1930. SantoDomingo: Centro Dominicano de InvestigacionesAntopológicas (CENDIA),Universidad Autónoma de Santo Domingo.51 De Moya Antonio. 2002 : Ni colour de rose, ni colour de hormiga: mujeres. SantoDomingo, Integral (COIN).Derby, Lauren. 1994: Haitians, Magic, and Money: Raza and Society in theHaitian-Dominican Borderlands,1900 to 1937. Comparative Studies in Society andHistory 36(3):488-526.Derby, Lauren and Richard Turits. 2005 : Temwayaj Kout Kouto 1937: Eyewitness tothe Genocide. In Revolutionary Freedoms.Cécile Accilien, Jessica Adams, and ElmideMéléance, eds. Pp. 137-143. Coconut Creek, FL: Caribbean Studies Press.D’Oleo, Frank. 2008: Informe de investigacion sobre los estudiantes universitarioshaitianos en la República Dominicana. Santo Domingo, República Dominicana: Fondode Estudios y Investigaciones Sociales.FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization). 2009: FAOSTAT. Country Reports (various years): Dominican Republic. Online document. http://faostat.fao.org/desktopdefault.aspx?pageid=342&lang=en&country=56. AccessedNovember 15, 2009.Fernández, Leonel. 1996: Discurso de Juramentación como Presidente de la RepúblicaDominicana. Online document. http://www.leonelfernandez.com/elpresidente/discursos/1996/16-08.html. AccessedNovember 15, 2009.Ferrán, Fernando I. and Pessar Patricia. 1991: “Dominican Agriculture and the Effectsof International Migration”. In Small Country Development and International LabourFlows. Anthony Maingot, ed. Boulder: WestviewPress.Gregory, Steven. 2006: The Devil Behind the Mirror: Globalization and Politics in theDominican Republic. Berkeley: University of California Press.Grupo Vicini. 2009: Áreas de negocios. Online document.http://www.grupovicini.com/grupos.php?id_c=16&id_g=13. Accessed March 1, 2009.Harvey, David: 2001 Capitalism: the Factory of Fragmentation. In Spaces of Capital. Pp. 121-127.Routledge: New York.Hoffnung-Garskof, Jesse. 2008: A Tale of Two Cities: Santo Domingo and New Yorkafter 1950. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Howard, David. 2001: Colouring the Nation: Race and Ethnicity in the DominicanRepublic. Oxford: Signal Books.Icon Group International, Inc. 2000: Executive Report on Strategies in the DominicanRepublic. Online document.www.icongroupedition.com. Accessed November 15, 2009.Lozano, Wilfredo. 1992: Migración Internacional y Economía Cafetalera. SantoDomingo, Centro de Planificación y Acción Ecuménica. Lozano, Wilfredo. 1993 : Agricultura e Inmigración: La Mano de Obra Haitiana en elMercado de Trabajo Rural Dominicano. In La Cuestion Haitiana en Santo Domingo. W.Lozano, ed. Pp. 80-105.Miami: Facultad Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales.52 Lozano, Wilfredo. 1997: La Urbanización de la Pobreza. Santo Domingo, RepúblicaDominicana. Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales. Lozano, Wilfredo. 2001: Los Trabajadores del Capitalismo Exportador. Colección delBanco Central de la República Dominicana.Martinez, Samuel. 1995: Peripheral Migrants. Knoxville: University of TennesseePress.Moya Pons, Frank. 1986 : El Batey. Santo Domingo, República Dominicana: Fondo para el Avance de las Ciencias Sociales.Murphy, Martin F. 1991: Dominican SugarPlantations. New York: Praeger Publishers.Nuñez, Padre Jose. 2008: Presentation at the screening of El desafio de la convivencia,April 3. Plaza de la Cultura. Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic.Paraison, Edwin 2009: Presentation for Haitian Community by Ministère des HaitiensVivant à l’Étranger (MHAVE), November 12. Centro Bonó. Santo Domingo,Dominican Republic. Schwerdtfeger, Martin. 2008: Dominican Republic’s GDP expands 8.5% in 2007.Global Insight Report. March 2008 Silié, Rubén, Carlos Segura, and Carlos Dore Cabral, 2002 : La Nueva InmigraciónHaitiana. Santo Domingo, República Dominicana: FLACSO.SJRM (Servicio Jesuita a Refugiados y Migrantes) 2008 : “Entre lo real, lo establecido, y lo deseable” Estudio de las condiciones labourales de los inmigrantes haitianos quetrabajan en el sector construcción en el Distrito Nacional de la República Dominicana..Santo Domingo: SJRM.(Servicio Jesuita a Refugiados y Migrantes) 2010 : Servicio Jesuita a Refugiados yMigrantes. Online document.http://www.sjrdom.org/spip/. Accessed November 15,2009.Smucker, Glenn R. and Gerald F. Murray, 2004: The Uses of Children: A Study ofTrafficking in Haitian Children. Port-au-Prince, Haiti: USAID/Haiti Mission.Tallec, Fabien and Louis Bockel, 2005: Commodity Chain Analysis. Food andAgricultural Organization of the United Nations. Online Document. http://www.fao.org/docs/up/easypol/330/cca_043en.pdf.Accessed December 12, 2009.Traub-Werner, Marion. 2008: “La globalización, el libro comercio y la fronterahaitiano-dominicana”. In Ciudades en la Frontera, Haroldo Dilla Alfonso, ed. Pp.205-230. Santo Domingo: Editora Manatí.Trouillot, Michel-Rolph. 1992 : “The Caribbean Region: an Open Frontier inAnthropological Theory.” Annual Review of Anthropology 21:19-42.Turits, Richard Lee. 2002: A World Destroyed, A Nation Imposed: The 1937 HaitianMassacre in the Dominican Republic. Hispanic American Review 82(3):589-635.Wooding, Bridget and Richard Moseley-Williams. 2004: Inmigrantes Haitianos yDominicanos de Ascendencia Haitiana en la República Dominicana. Santo Domingo:Cooperación Internacional para el Desarollo.53 Wooding, Bridget and Alicia Sangro, 2008 : Una cuestión de entendimiento: la presencia de las mujeres migrantes haitianas en el servicio doméstico en la República Dominicana. República Dominicana: FLACSO.54




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